Rent Dissipation in Repeated Entry Games: Some New Results

Jean-Pierre Ponssard

No 1186, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Two-player infinitely-repeated-entry games are revisited using a new Markov equilibrium concept. The idea is to have an incumbent facing a hit and run entrant. Rent dissipation no longer necessarily holds. It will not when competition is tough in case of entry. Similarities and differences with previous approaches are analyzed. Several economic illustrations are discussed.

Keywords: rent dissipation; Markov equilibria; hit and run (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ent, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Working Paper: Rent dissipation in repeated entry games: some new results (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1186

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