Altruistic Cooperation

Aurel Stenzel, Johannes Lohse, Till Requate and Israel Waichman

No 11880, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We characterize 'Games of Altruistic Cooperation' as a class of games in which cooperation leaves the individual and the group of decision-makers worse off than defection, but favors individuals outside the group. An example is climate change mitigation. In this context, we experimentally investigate whether decentralized institutions using costly punishment and/or communication support altruistic cooperation to sustain the welfare of future generations. Without punishment or communication, cooperation is low; communication alone even increases the incidence of zero contributions. However, combining peer punishment with communication strongly increases cooperation, showing that an effective decentralized solution to a Game of Altruistic Cooperation exists.

Keywords: games of altruistic cooperation; social dilemma; intergenerational good game; punishment; communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D74 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11880

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