Profit-Share Auctions in Procurement

Olivier Bos, Nicolas Fugger and Sander Onderstal

No 12071, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We investigate profit-share auctions in a procurement context, comparing them with traditional cash auctions to identify which mechanism yields lower expenses for buyers. We also explore whether specifying a high project value in profit-share auction contracts influences supplier bidding behavior. Using theoretical analysis and experimental methods, we observe that profit-share auctions lead to lower buyer expenses compared to traditional cash auctions. Furthermore, we find that the buyer benefits from specifying a high project value in the contract, as this commitment induces more aggressive bidding from the suppliers. While profit-share auctions result in significantly lower buyer expenses than cash auctions, the observed differences are smaller than predicted. This discrepancy is due to (i) more pronounced underbidding in cash auctions and (ii) lower efficiency in profit-share auctions caused by noisy bidding. Our findings suggest that managers can reduce procurement costs by adopting profit-share auctions and strategically committing to a high project value in contracts. However, they should be aware that real-world savings may be smaller than theoretically predicted due to supplier bidding behavior.

Keywords: procurement; profit-share auctions; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12071

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