Strategic Uncertainty and Sequential Play

Ala Avoyan and Daniela Valdivia

No 12198, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The paper examines how the timing of decisions shapes outcomes in coordination settings. Theoretically, the outcomes become predictable and efficient when decisions are made sequentially rather than simultaneously. Our experimental evidence shows that sequential moves promote remarkably high efficiency, and these effects are far less sensitive to increased group size. A key finding is that the sequential structure alters the distribution of strategic uncertainty in a group, aggregating it and allocating most of it to the first mover. Dynamic measures further reveal that coordination failures under simultaneous moves stem from weak resilience to setbacks rather than fragility of equilibria.

Keywords: strategic uncertainty; order of moves; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12198

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