The Invisible Hand Plays Dice: Eventualities in Religious Markets
Panu Poutvaara () and
No 1238, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Religious participation is much more widespread in the United States than in Europe, while Europeans tend to view sects more suspiciously than Americans. We propose an explanation for these patterns without assuming differences in preferences or market fundamentals. Religious markets may have multiple equilibria, suggesting that observed differences in religious structures may merely be eventualities. Further, equilibria with more sects result in higher welfare and lower membership costs, as secular societies tend to host on average more demanding sects. Our main methodological contribution to the theory of religious markets is endogenizing simultaneously supply and demand of spiritual services.
Keywords: sects; religion; tithes; religious markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 J24 L89 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: The Invisible Hand Plays Dice: Eventualities in Religious Markets (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1238
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().