The Original Ideas Game and the Vanishing of the Absurd Heroes: Academic Reputation Hierarchies and Their Implications

João Ricardo Faria and Rajeev Goel

No 12590, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In perfectly competitive academic and idea markets, a divide emerges between elite scientists and the rest. The elite publish original, impactful work, while others - absurd heroes - struggle for recognition, often in vain. Though the original ideas game produces an equilibrium resembling perfect competition, it is driven by a hierarchical structure. This reflects the organization of real-world science, where limited incentives and access prevent most researchers from publishing and advancing original ideas.

Keywords: academic research; citations; scientific ideas; reputations; absurd heroes; elite scientists; differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D83 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-sog
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