Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary

Lars Feld and Stefan Voigt

No 1260, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: It is argued that an independent judiciary is a necessary condition for both individual liberty and economic prosperity. After having surveyed the literature dealing with how to arrange for an independent judiciary, the authors derive some additional policy implications by drawing on two indicators of judicial independence (JI) recently introduced by them. De facto JI has a robust and highly significant impact on economic growth. Individual components of both de jure and de facto JI on economic growth are estimated for their impact on economic growth. Additionally, the effects of other institutional arrangements such as presidential vs. parliamentary systems are inquired into.

Keywords: judicial independence; constitutional design; positive constitutional economics; economic growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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