Performance Rating and Yardstick Competition in Social Service Provision
Federico Revelli ()
No 1270, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
This paper investigates whether national evaluation of decentralised government performance tends, by lessening local information spill-overs, to reduce the scope for local performance comparisons and consequently to lower the extent of spatial auto-correlation among local government expenditures. It analyses UK local government expenditures on personal social services before and after the introduction of a national performance assessment system (SSPR, Social Services Performance Rating) that would attribute a rating to each local authority. The empirical evidence suggests that the introduction of the SSPR has substantially reduced policy mimicking among neighboring jurisdictions.
Keywords: social services; welfare competition; information spill-overs; spatial auto-correlation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Performance rating and yardstick competition in social service provision (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1270
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