Performance Rating and Yardstick Competition in Social Service Provision

Federico Revelli

No 1270, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper investigates whether national evaluation of decentralised government performance tends, by lessening local information spill-overs, to reduce the scope for local performance comparisons and consequently to lower the extent of spatial auto-correlation among local government expenditures. It analyses UK local government expenditures on personal social services before and after the introduction of a national performance assessment system (SSPR, Social Services Performance Rating) that would attribute a rating to each local authority. The empirical evidence suggests that the introduction of the SSPR has substantially reduced policy mimicking among neighboring jurisdictions.

Keywords: social services; welfare competition; information spill-overs; spatial auto-correlation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Performance rating and yardstick competition in social service provision (2006)
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