To Catch a Thief: Endogenous Policing and Choice of Location by Criminals

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Antonio Cabrales and Kaustav Das

No 12756, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper develops a tractable model of offender location choice and police resource allocation across multiple areas. Individuals differ in the cost of apprehension and choose whether to commit crime and, if so, where. Each area contains a fixed value of criminal opportunities, so offenders impose congestion on one another, while policing affects expected apprehension. For arbitrary policing levels, equilibrium sorts offenders by apprehension cost across areas ordered by policing per unit of criminal opportunity value. With a fixed police budget, welfare maximization equalizes policing-to-value ratios across all active areas. The model shows when place-based policing should target the value of criminal opportunities rather than observed crime counts alone, since observed crime may already reflect prior police allocation and offender displacement.

Keywords: crime; policing; hot spot policing; displacement; spatial sorting; resource allocation; law enforcement; congestion. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 H41 K42 R12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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