Local Land-Use Regulations: Incentives for Adoption and Desirability of State-Level Override Laws

Jan K. Brueckner

No 12786, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper demonstrates both the local incentives to impose supply-restricting land-use regulations as well as their broader inefficiency, using a theoretical model that is simple and accessible. Although the theme of the paper is somewhat familiar from older work, an updated analysis has value given the striking recent emergence of state-level overrides of local land-use regulations in the US, which the model's social planner would support. These overrides, which are directed at the problem of housing unaffordability, represent an historic phenomenon because regulation of land-use has been the responsibility of local governments in the US for well over a hundred years. As a result, it is important for theoretical analysis to demonstrate their desirability.

Keywords: land-use regulations; NIMBY; state overrride (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12786

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