Enforcement Spillovers and the Efficiency Costs of Means-Tested Transfers: Evidence from Workplace Networks
Joan Vilá,
Marcelo Bérgolo and
Guillermo Cruces
No 12805, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
Standard welfare evaluations of means-tested transfers typically treat eligibility enforcement as affecting only households directly exposed to the rule. We show that this direct-only approach is incomplete when enforcement events transmit information through workplace networks, inducing other beneficiaries to adjust formal employment and reported earnings. We study Uruguay’s AFAM-PE conditional cash transfer, in which household income eligibility is verified monthly using administrative records of formal earnings and households exceeding the threshold may lose benefits, while most beneficiaries are largely unaware of the income rule. Linking program records, social security employment histories, and firm identifiers, we build workplace networks from pre-event employment histories and identify spillovers using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design that exploits quasi-random variation in whether a peer crosses the income threshold. Coworkers of peers just above the cutoff reduce registered labor earnings by 20%, and the corresponding fuzzy-RD estimate implies a decline of about one-third of baseline earnings in response to a peer’s suspension. These effects emerge within two months and persist for at least 12 months. The response operates almost entirely on the extensive margin of formal employment, and the evidence suggests that most of the decline reflects transitions to informal work rather than exit from the labor force. Spillovers are concentrated in small firms and among similar coworkers, are more than two times larger when the peer actively contacted the program’s support service, and are not statistically significant among non-beneficiary coworkers. This pattern is consistent with information transmission as the main channel. In an MVPF calculation for a marginal enforcement event under limited information, the suspended peer’s own response offsets 89% of the transfer saved by the government; once coworkers’ responses are incorporated, fiscal externalities are 2.4 times the transfer saved, so the event raises net government spending while lowering beneficiaries’ welfare. These findings imply that evaluations focusing only on directly exposed households can understate the cost of enforcement when eligibility is monitored through formal earnings and enforcement events transmit information across beneficiaries.
Keywords: social assistance; income-testing; enforcement spillovers; peer effects; workplace networks; informality; MVPF (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H53 H75 I38 J13 J22 J46 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net
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Related works:
Working Paper: Enforcement Spillovers and the Efficiency Costs of Means-Tested Transfers: Evidence from Workplace Networks (2026) 
Working Paper: Enforcement Spillovers and the Efficiency Costs of Means-Tested Transfers: Evidence from Workplace Networks (2026) 
Working Paper: Enforcement Spillovers and the Efficiency Costs of Means-Tested Transfers: Evidence from Workplace Networks (2026) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12805
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