Getting In and Getting Through: Ex Ante Beliefs and Counterfactual Outcomes in Centralized College Admissions
Pamela Giustinelli and
Edwin Leuven
No 13107, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
College applicants in centralized systems rank programs before they know where they will be admitted and whether they will enroll and complete. We surveyed Norwegian applicants about these prospects for their first two choices after applying but before admissions and link their beliefs to administrative records. Comparing applicants just above and below admission cutoffs allows us to validate these beliefs with outcomes. Marginal applicants slightly overpredict enrollment if admitted to their first choice and underpredict it at their second, increasing between-program prediction error. While they substantially overpredict completion given enrollment for both programs, the error in the difference between programs is much smaller. In a model of applicants’ rankings, correcting completion beliefs for one program changes the predicted probability of ranking the current first choice above the second by 12-14 percentage points, whereas correcting both barely changes it. Our study sheds light on validation of subjective counterfactuals and implications of their correction.
Keywords: subjective expectations; counterfactual outcomes; centralized college admissions; college enrollment; college completion; program rankings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 C83 D84 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13107
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