Manufacturing Renaissance Meets Time-Inconsistent Tariffs

Christoph E. Boehm, Andrei A. Levchenko and Wei Xiang

No 13118, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We analyze optimal tariffs in a dynamic version of the Venables (1987) framework with a time-to-build lag in firm creation. In this environment, trade protection is driven by the desire to increase firm creation at home at the expense of the foreign trade partner. When firm creation takes time, the benefits of protection accrue in the future, whereas the costs in the form of higher consumer prices occur immediately. Under certain parameterizations, a policymaker that can commit to a full time path of tariffs leaves trade unrestricted at date 0, and announces high tariffs coming on at a pre-specified future period. But there is a time inconsistency: the policymaker’s short-run incentive is not to impose contemporaneous tariffs due to the adverse effect on prices. Thus, lack of commitment to future tariffs can preserve free(er) trade and derail a manufacturing renaissance.

Keywords: optimal dynamic tariffs; delocation; time inconsistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F02 F12 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp13118.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13118

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().