Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions (new title: Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result)

Frank Riedel and Elmar Wolfstetter

No 1315, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily many bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding.

Keywords: Simultaneous Ascending Auction; weak dominance; multi-unit auctions; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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