Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic

Jens Josephson and Karl Wärneryd

No 1319, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.

Keywords: work ethic; evolution; group selection; public goods; stochastic dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
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Related works:
Journal Article: Long-run selection and the work ethic (2008)
Working Paper: Long-run selection and the work ethic (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1319

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