Political Economy of Commuting Subsidies
Rainald Borck () and
Matthias Wrede ()
No 1339, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
We study the political economy of commuting subsidies in a model of a mono-centric city with two income classes. Depending on housing demand and transport costs, either the rich or the poor live in the central city and the other group in the suburbs. Commuting subsidies increase the net income of those with long commutes or high transport costs. They also affect land rents and therefore the income of landowners. The paper studies how the locational pattern of the two income classes and the incidence of landownership affects the support for commuting subsidies.
Keywords: commuting subsidies; voting; monocentric city (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-pol and nep-ure
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Journal Article: Political economy of commuting subsidies (2005)
Working Paper: Political Economy of Commuting Subsidies (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1339
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