Dumping in Developing and Transition Economies

Jose Moraga-Gonzalez and Jean-Marie Viaene

No 1356, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We build a simple theoretical model to understand why developing and transition economies have increasingly applied anti-dumping laws. To that end, we investigate the strategic incentives of oligopolistic exporting firms to undertake dumping in these economies. We show that dumping may be due to cross-country differences in income, to the extent of tariff protection and to the exchange rate depreciations observed recently. Dumping may arise even if consumers exhaust all arbitrage possibilities.

Keywords: dumping; exchange rate; optimal trade policy; product quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Dumping in Developing and Transition Economies (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1356

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