Noncooperative Support of Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies

Josef Falkinger

No 1368, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In small groups norm enforcement is provided by mutual punishment and reward. In large societies we have enforcement institutions. This paper shows how such institutions can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. In a first stage, individuals invest in a public enforcement technology. This technology generates a sanctioning system whose effectiveness depends on the aggregate amount of invested resources. In a second stage, in which individuals contribute to the provision of a public good, the sanctioning system imposes penalties and rewards on deviations from the endogenous norm contribution. It is shown that even if group size goes to infinity public norm enforcement is supported in a noncooperative equilibrium. Psychological factors are not necessary but can be favorable for the emergence of effective public norm enforcement.

Keywords: norm enforcement; public goods; institutions; sanctioning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-law, nep-pbe and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1368

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