When the Union Hurts the Workers: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy
Giorgio Bellettini () and
Carlotta Berti Ceroni ()
No 1421, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
This paper studies the determinants of immigration policy in an economy with entrepreneurs and workers where a trade union has monopoly power over wages. The presence of the union leads a benevolent government to implement a high level of immigration and induces a welfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view, but even from the point of view of workers. In the politico-economic equilibrium where interest groups lobby for immigration, we show the condition under which workers are no longer hurt by the presence of the union.
JEL-codes: F22 J51 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-lab and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1421
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