Bargaining Power and Equilibrium Consumption

Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller

No 1448, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic the welfare of all household members moves in the same direction when bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) of outside consumers. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to benefit if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the same.

Keywords: household behavior; bargaining power; local and global changes; price effects; general equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 D50 D62 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1448

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