Tradable Emission Permits in a Federal System

Harrie A. A Verbon and Cees Withagen

No 1482, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: A system of tradable permits in the standard setting is effective in attaining the policy objective with regard to pollution reduction at the least cost. This outcome is challenged in case of a tradable permit system in a federal state with individual states having discretionary power regarding environmental policy and where pollution is transboundary across states. This paper explores the opportunities of the central authority to influence the effectiveness of the system, under different institutional arrangements, through the initial allocation of permits.

Keywords: tradable permits; trade bans; fiscal federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-int and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Tradable emission permits in a federal system (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1482

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