On-the-Job Search and Sorting

Pieter Gautier, C. N. Teulings () and Aico van Vuuren

No 1537, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We characterize the equilibrium of a search model with a continuum of job and worker types, wage bargaining, free entry of vacancies and on-the-job search. The decentralized economy with monopsonistic wage setting yields too many vacancies and hence too low unemployment compared to first best. This is due to a business-stealing externality. Raising workers’ bargaining power resolves this inefficiency. Unemployment benefits are a second best alternative to this policy. We establish simple relations between the losses in production due to search frictions and wage differentials on the one hand and unemployment on the other hand. Both can be used for empirical testing.

JEL-codes: J30 J60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On-the-Job Search and Sorting (2006)
Working Paper: On-the-Job Search and Sorting (2005)
Working Paper: On-The-Job Search and Sorting (2005)
Working Paper: On-the-Job Search and Sorting (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1537

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