Structural Separation and Access in Telecommunications Markets

Paul de Bijl

No 1554, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper presents a basic framework to assess whether structural (vertical) separation is desirable. It is discussed within the setting of fixed telecommunications markets. From an economist’s perspective, the key question that underlies the case for structural separation is: is there a persistent bottleneck? The obvious candidate is the ‘local loop’, or local access network. If yes then it makes sense to compare the costs and benefits of structural separation. The framework provides a set of options that the regulator can use strategically, by using the threat of a break-up to influence an incumbent’s competitive stance in the wholesale market.

JEL-codes: L12 L40 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Structural Separation and Access in Telecommunications Markets (2005)
Working Paper: Structural Separation and Access in the Telecommunications Markets (2004)
Working Paper: Structural Separation and Access in the Telecommunications Markets (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1554

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