The Scandal Matrix: The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society

Manfred J. Holler and Bengt-Arne Wickström

No 159, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Social conventions and norms can be modeled as equilibria of coordination games. It is argued that the critical mass necessary for a society to move from one convention, that is from one equilibrium, to another changes with changes in the population structure due to generation shifts. A scandal is defined as a breach of the accepted norm by a prominent person When the critical mass necessary for a change in the accepted convention is sufficiently small, a scandal can trigger such a change since the scandal maker has a certain number of sympathizers, who follow her in breaking the accepted norm. The argument is illustrated with several examples from the history of mankind.

JEL-codes: C72 D74 J19 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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