Bureaucratic Corruption and Profit Tax Evasion

Laszlo Goerke

No 1666, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on production activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affect corruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce less corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a non-systematic impact on tax evasion behaviour.

Keywords: corruption; firms; tax evasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H25 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-pbe and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1666

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