Job Security and Work Absence: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Assar Lindbeck, Mårten Palme and Mats Persson

No 1687, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislation for small firms in Sweden in 2001. According to our differences-in-difference estimates, aggregate absence in these firms fell by 0.2-0.3 days per year. This aggregate net figure hides important effects on different groups of employees. Workers remaining in the reform firms after the reform reduced their absence by about one day. People with a high absence record tended to leave reform firms, but these firms also became less reluctant to hire people with a record of high absence.

Keywords: seniority rules; sick pay insurance; firing costs; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias, nep-lab, nep-ltv and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Job Security and Work Absence: Evidence form a Natural Experiment (2006)
Working Paper: Job Security and Work Absence: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2006)
Working Paper: Job Security and Work Absence: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1687

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