Pareto-Improving Unemployment Policies

Jörg Lingens and Klaus Wälde

No 1807, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We investigate how continental European unemployment can be reduced without reducing unemployment benefits and without reducing the net income of low-wage earners. Lower unemployment replacement rates reduce unemployment, the net wage and unemployment benefits. A lower tax on labour increases net wages and - for certain benefit-systems - unemployment benefits as well. Combining these two policies allows to reduce unemployment in countries with “net-Bismarck” and Beveridge systems without reducing net income of workers or of the unemployed. Such a policy becomes self-financing under realistic parameter constellations when taxes are reduced only for low-income workers.

Keywords: inequality; unemployment; taxation; policy reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E60 H23 J38 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-mac and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Pareto-Improving Unemployment Policies (2009)
Working Paper: Pareto-Improving Unemployment Policies (2007)
Working Paper: Pareto-Improving Unemployment Policies (2005)
Working Paper: Pareto - Improving Unemployment Policies (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1807

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