Competition for Viewers and Advertisers in a TV Oligopoly

Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen () and Lars Sørgard

No 1862, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We consider a model of a TV oligopoly where TV channels transmit advertising and viewers dislike such commercials. We show that advertisers make a lower profit the larger the number of TV channels. If TV channels are sufficiently close substitutes, there will be underprovision of advertising relative to social optimum. We also find that the more viewers dislike ads, the more likely it is that welfare is increasing in the number of advertising financed TV channels. A publicly owned TV channel can partly correct market distortions, in some cases by having a larger amount of advertising than private TV channels. It may even have advertising in cases where advertising is wasteful per se.

Keywords: television industry; advertising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse, nep-cul, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition for Viewers and Advertisers in a TV Oligopoly (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1862

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