Harassment, Corruption and Economic Policy

Sugata Marjit, Vivekananda Mukherjee and Arijit Mukherjee

No 189, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper introduces "harassment" in a model of bribery and corruption. We characterize the harassment equilibrium and show that taxpayers with all possible levels of income participate in such an equilibrium. Harassment has a regressive bias. Harassment cost as such may not affect tax revenue. However, when the decision to file tax-returns is endogenized, harassment cost can affect the filing pattern and hence the revenue collection. We study the nature of the equilibrium under imperfect information when different types of taxpayers and different types of auditors are introduced in the system.

Keywords: Corruption; Harassment; Filing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_189

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