Labor Market Regulation and the Legal System

Carsten Hefeker and Michael Neugart

No 2041, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: When enacting labor market regulation governments face courts that interpret and implement the legal code. We show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts. Given that judges have more discretion in common as opposed to civil law systems more reform activity as a response to crises should be observed in the former system. This finding is backed by evidence from a panel of OECD countries.

Keywords: labor market regulation; labor courts; uncertainty; unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2041.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Labor market regulation and the legal system (2010)
Working Paper: Labor market regulation and the legal system (2010)
Working Paper: Labor Market Regulation and the Legal System (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2041

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().