Is the Notification of Monitoring a Threat to the Unemployed? A Regression Discontinuity Approach

Bart Cockx and Muriel Dejemeppe

No 2042, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In July 2004, the Belgian government intensified monitoring within the Unemployment Insurance scheme. Workers claiming unemployment benefits for more than 13 months are notified that past job-search behavior will be monitored 8 months later. In one region the target group is counselled shortly after the notification, while in others not or only once the monitoring has taken place. We exploit the discontinuity in the treatment assignment at the age of 30 to evaluate the threat effect of the notification on the probability of employment. We find that the effect is heterogeneous and critically depends on whether and when notified workers are counselled.

Keywords: evaluation; monitoring job-search; threat effect; regression-discontinuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2042.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: IIs the Notification of Monitoring a Threat to the Unemployed ? A Regression Discontinuity Approach (2007)
Working Paper: Is the Notification of Monitoring a Threat to the Unemployed? A Regression Discontinuity Approach (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2042

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe (wohlrabe@ifo.de).