Limited Commitment Models of the Labour Market

Jonathan Thomas and Timothy Worrall

No 2109, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We present an overview of models of long-term self-enforcing labor contracts in which risk sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed which is sufficiently general to encompass the two-agent problem central to most of the literature, including variable hours. We consider two-sided limited commitment and look at its implications for aggregate labor market variables. We consider the implications for empirical testing and the available empirical evidence. We also consider the one-sided limited commitment problem for which there exists a considerable amount of empirical support.

Keywords: labor contracts; self-enforcing contracts; unemployment; business cycle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: LIMITED COMMITMENT MODELS OF THE LABOUR MARKET (2007)
Working Paper: Limited Commitment Models of the Labour Market (2007)
Working Paper: Limited Commitment Models of the Labour Market (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2109

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