Competition and Waiting Times in Hospital Markets

Kurt Brekke (), Luigi Siciliani and Odd Rune Straume

No 2124, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of hospital competition on waiting times. We use a Salop-type model, with hospitals that differ in (geographical) location and, potentially, waiting time, and two types of patients; high-benefit patients who choose between neighbouring hospitals (competitive segment), and low-benefit patients who decide whether or not to demand treatment from the closest hospital (monopoly segment). Compared with a benchmark case of monopoly, we find that hospital competition leads to longer waiting times in equilibrium if the competitive segment is sufficiently large. Given a policy regime of hospital competition, the effect of increased competition depends on the parameter of measurement: Lower travelling costs increase waiting times, higher hospital density reduces waiting times, while the effect of a larger competitive segment is ambiguous. We also show that, if the competitive segment is large, hospital competition is socially preferable to monopoly only if the (regulated) treatment price is sufficiently high.

Keywords: hospitals; competition; waiting times (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H42 I11 I18 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition and waiting times in hospital markets (2008)
Working Paper: Competition and Waiting Times in Hospital Markets (2007)
Working Paper: Competition and Waiting Times in Hospital Markets (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2124

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