Mobile Tax Base as a Global Common

Kai Konrad

No 2144, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: If countries anticipate Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that makes some of their tax payers less mobile or increases the mobility of tax payers elsewhere. I provide piecemeal evidence on what activities countries use. I analyse how such activities interact with Bertrand tax competition if the size of the group of loyal and non-loyal citizens or investors is endogenous. Further I consider the implications of tax harmonization and minimum taxes for these types of non-price competition. Home attachment reduces the intensity of tax competition, but generates a strategic disadvantage for the country that invests much in such home attachment. Harmonization of taxes and high minimum taxes can intensify countries’ investment in home attachment.

Keywords: tax competition; common pool; advertizing; nation brands; instilling preferences; home bias; patriotism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 F22 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Mobile tax base as a global common (2008)
Working Paper: Mobile tax base as a global common (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2144

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