Habit Formation, Strategic Extremism and Debt Policy

Egil Matsen and Øystein Thøgersen

No 2169, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We suggest a probabilistic voting model where voters’ preferences for alternative public goods display habit formation. Current policies determine habit levels and in turn the future preferences of the voters. This allows the incumbent to act strategically in order to influence the probability of re-election. Comparing to a benchmark case of a certain re-election, we demonstrate that the incumbent’s optimal policy features both a more polarized allocation between the alternative public goods and a debt bias.

Keywords: budget deficits; voting; extremism; habit formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Related works:
Journal Article: Habit formation, strategic extremism, and debt policy (2010)
Working Paper: Habit formation, strategic extremism, and debt policy (2010)
Working Paper: Habit formation, strategic extremism and debt policy (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2169

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