Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator

Anne van Aaken (), Lars Feld and Stefan Voigt

No 2245, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.

Keywords: corruption; prosecution agencies; judicial independence and positive constitutional economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 K40 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2245

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