Contract Enforcement, Institutions and Social Capital: the Maghribi Traders Reappraised

Jeremy Edwards and Sheilagh Ogilvie

No 2254, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Economists draw important lessons for modern development from the medieval Maghribi traders who, according to Greif, enforced contracts multilaterally through a closed, private-order ‘coalition’. We show that this view is untenable. The Maghribis used formal legal mechanisms and entered business associations with non-Maghribis. Not a single empirical example adduced by Greif shows that any ‘coalition’ actually existed. The Maghribis cannot be used to argue that the social capital of exclusive networks will facilitate exchange in developing economies. Nor do they provide any support for the cultural theories of economic development and institutional change for which they have been mobilised.

Keywords: contract enforcement; reputation; legal system; social network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Contract enforcement, institutions, and social capital: the Maghribi traders reappraised (2012)
Working Paper: Contract Enforcement, Institutions and Social Capital: the Maghribi Traders Reappraised (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2254

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