French CEO Compensations: What is the Cost of a Mandatory Upper Limit?

Fabienne Llense

No 2402, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In the middle of the nineties, the sharp increase in globalisation and the last privatization wave have promoted the shaping of a market for executives in France. Characteristics of this market are estimated for France and a competitive model is simulated in order to assess to what extend such a model could explain the observed CEO compensations. The size elasticity of compensation in France is equal to 0.5 and justifies a large magnitude in compensation. To moderate those compensations, a wage cap is often called for by opinion and the European left but also, more surprisingly, by representative of shareholders. The cost of this policy is evaluated in this sorting model and the lobbying of shareholders is explained.

JEL-codes: D33 D41 J31 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: French CEOs' Compensations: What is the Cost of a Mandatory Upper Limit? (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2402

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