Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Provision of Public Input Goods in an Economy with Outsourcing and Unemployment

Thomas Aronsson and Erkki Koskela

No 2481, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper concerns optimal redistributive income taxation and provision of a public input good in a two-type model with a minimum wage policy implemented for the low-ability type, where firms may use some of their resources for outsourcing by locating part of the production process abroad. Our results show that the incentive to relax the self-selection constraint and the incentive to increase employment among the low-skilled reinforce each other in terms of marginal income taxation. In addition, the appearance of equilibrium unemployment also provides an incentive for the government to directly tax outsourcing. Without a direct instrument for taxing outsourcing, the government may reduce the amount of resources spent on outsourcing by increased provision of the public input good, which is desirable in the sense that reduced outsourcing contributes to less wage inequality and increased employment.

Keywords: outsourcing; optimal nonlinear taxation; public goods; unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H25 J31 J62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Provision of Public Input Goods in an Economy with Outsourcing and Unemployment (2009)
Working Paper: Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Provision of Public Input Goods in an Economy with Outsourcing and Unemployment (2008)
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