Auctions when Bidders Prepare by Investing in Ideas

Thomas Jeitschko and Elmar Wolfstetter

No 258, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum, and sketch the impact of information spillovers.

Keywords: Auctions; procurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas (2000)
Working Paper: Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_258

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