Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design under EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach

Bas van Aarle, Jacob Engwerda, Joseph Plasmans (), Arie Weeren and Bas Van Aarle
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Bas van Aarle

No 262, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper analyzes the problem of designing macroeconomic stabilization policies within the European Monetary Union (EMU) as a dynamic game between a centralized monetary authority, the European Central Bank (ECB), and national fiscal policy makers. Non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium and cooperative Nash bargaining solutions are determined under various assumptions about r ationing regimes in goods and labor markets and structural characteristics of the economies involved.

Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Monetary and fiscal policy design under EMU: a dynamic game approach (1999)
Working Paper: Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design under EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach (1999)
Working Paper: Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design under EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach (1999)
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