Asymmetric Information Renders Minimum Wages Less Harmful

Ronnie Schöb and Marcel Thum
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ronnie Schoeb

No 2623, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We show that a minimum wage introduced in the presence of asymmetric information about worker productivities will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and symmetric information.

Keywords: minimum wages; unemployment; asymmetric information; labour market regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H50 J20 J30 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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