Agency in Family Policy: A Survey

Alessandro Cigno

No 2664, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Given that young children are under the control of their parents, if the government has an interest in either the welfare or the productivity of the former, it has no option but to act through the latter. Parents are, in the ordinary sense of the word, the government’s agents. They are agents also in the sense of Principal-Agent theory if the parental action of concern to the government is private information. This throws doubt on some established optimal-taxation results, and gives rise to some new ones.

Keywords: optimal taxation; optimal family allowances; hidden ability to raise children; hidden educational investments; endogenous and exogenous fertility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 D82 H24 H31 J13 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Agency in Family Policy: A Survey (2011)
Working Paper: Agency in family policy: a survey (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2664

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