International Cooperation on Climate-Friendly Technologies

Rolf Golombek and Michael Hoel (mihoel@econ.uio.no)

No 2677, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We examine international cooperation on technological development as a supplement to, or an alternative to, international cooperation on emission reductions. R&D should be increased beyond the non-cooperative level if (i) the technology level in one country is positively affected by R&D in other countries, (ii) the domestic carbon tax is lower than the Pigovian level, or (iii) the domestic carbon tax is set directly through an international tax agreement. A second-best technology agreement has higher R&D, higher emissions, or both compared with the first-best-outcome. The second-best subsidy always exceeds the subsidy under no international R&D cooperation. Further, when the price of carbon is the same in the second-best technology agreement and in the case without R&D cooperation, welfare is highest, R&D is highest and emissions are lowest in the second-best R&D agreement.

Keywords: climate policy; international climate agreements; R&D policy; technology spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 O30 Q20 Q38 Q48 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: International Cooperation on Climate-friendly Technologies (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2677

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