International Trade and Transnational Insecurity: How Comparative Advantage and Power are Jointly Determined

Michelle Garfinkel, Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos ()

No 2680, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We augment the canonical neoclassical model of trade to allow for interstate disputes over land, oil, water, or other resources. The costs of such disputes in terms of arming depend on the trade regime in place. Under either autarky or free trade, the larger country (in terms of factor endowments) need not to be more powerful. Yet, under free trade, there is a stronger tendency for arming incentives to be equalized and thus for a “leveling of the playing field.” Depending on world prices, free trade can intensify arming incentives to such an extent that the additional security costs swamp the traditional gains from trade and thus render autarky more desirable for one or both rival states. Furthermore, contestation of resources can reverse a country’s apparent comparative advantage relative to its comparative advantage in the absence of conflict. And, where such conflict is present, comparisons of autarkic prices to world prices could be inaccurate predictors of trade patterns.

Keywords: trade openness; property rights; interstate disputes; conflict; security policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D30 D70 D72 D74 F10 F20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: International Trade and Transnational Insecurity: How Comparative Advantage and Power are Jointly Determined (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2680

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