Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals and Fiscal Equalization

Caterina Liesegang and Marco Runkel ()

No 2747, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of fiscal equalization on the efficiency properties of corporate income tax rates chosen by symmetric countries in a Nash tax competition game under the taxation principles of Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment. Fiscal equalization ensures efficiency if the marginal transfer just reflects the fiscal and pecuniary externalities of tax rates. In contrast to previous studies, tax base equalization (Representative Tax System) does not satisfy this condition, but combining tax revenue and private income equalization does, regardless of which taxation principle is implemented. Under Formula Apportionment, tax base equalization is superior to tax revenue equalization if the wage income externality is sufficiently large.

Keywords: separate accounting; formula apportionment; fiscal equalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H25 H71 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals and Fiscal Equalization (2009)
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