Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information

Gerlinde Fellner, Rupert Sausgruber and Christian Traxler

No 2787, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong alert effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailing conditions a legal threat that stresses a high detection risk has a significant and highly robust deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others’ behavior enhances compliance. However, the information condition has a positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. Overall, the economic model of crime performs remarkably well in explaining our data.

Keywords: field experiments; law enforcement; compliance; deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: TESTING ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE FIELD: THREAT, MORAL APPEAL AND SOCIAL INFORMATION (2013)
Working Paper: Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information (2009)
Working Paper: Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information (2009)
Working Paper: Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information (2009)
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