Externality-correcting Taxes and Regulation

Vidar Christiansen and Stephen Smith

No 2793, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Much of the literature on externalities has considered taxes and direct regulation as alternative policy instruments. Both instruments may in practice be imperfect, reflecting informational deficiencies and other limitations. We analyse the use of taxes and regulation in combination, to control externalities arising from individual consumption behaviour. We consider cases where taxes are either imperfectly differentiated to reflect individual differences in externalities, or where some consumption escapes taxation. In both cases we characterise the optimal instrument mix, and show how changing the level of direct regulation alters the optimal externality tax.

Keywords: externalities; Pigouvian taxes; regulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2793.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Externality‐Correcting Taxes and Regulation (2012)
Working Paper: Externality-correcting taxes and regulation (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2793

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().