Existence and Warr Neutrality for Matching Equilibria in a Public Good Economy: An Aggregative Game Approach

Wolfgang Buchholz (), Richard Cornes and Dirk Rübbelke

No 2884, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Using the aggregative game approach as developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007) this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria in which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good. In particular we show that the distribution of income among the agents is a crucial determinant for the existence of interior matching equilibria. In addition, we explore which matching mechanisms show Warr neutrality and how the size of the economy affects the possibility of implementing a certain type of Pareto optimal solutions through matching.

JEL-codes: H41 H77 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2884

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