Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future

Michael McBride () and Stergios Skaperdas

No 2897, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In many instances of potential violent or non-violent conflict the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. In such environments we show that, as the future becomes more important, open conflict becomes more likely than settlement. We demonstrate the theoretical robustness of this finding, discuss its applicability in war, litigation, and other settings, and test it in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects are more likely to engage in risky conflict as the future becomes more important.

Keywords: conflict; litigation; property rights; folk theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D01 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Conflict, settlement, and the shadow of the future (2014)
Working Paper: Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2897

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